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THE HOUSES THAT EMINENT DOMAIN AND
HOUSING TAX CREDITS BUILT:
IMAGINING A BETTER
NEW ORLEANS
Carol Necole Brown* and Serena M. Williams**
Throughout its history, New Orleans has been largely immune to bril-
liant and innovative ideas.  Indeed, this is one of its principal charms.  If
you are not a native New Orleanian, ask yourself why you decided to live
here and chances are it has something to do with what Ignatius J. Reilly
described as New Orleans’ “stagnation and apathy which I find
inoffensive.”1
Still, she longs
for the Quarter—lights, riverboats churning,
the tinkle of ice in a slim bar glass.
Each night a refrain, its plain blue notes
carrying her, slightly swaying, home.2
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I. INTRODUCTION
Proposals for investing in and rebuilding urban enclaves such as
New Orleans are layered with controversy and difficulty.  One of
the most significant impediments to rebuilding New Orleans will be
addressing the need to replenish the depleted rental housing mar-
ket.  Racial and economic integration of housing markets and ap-
propriate use of private sector money to replenish the rental
housing stock within a “reasonable” time period are indispensable
components of a responsible revitalization and renewal plan.3
This Article contends that a combination of the smart exercise of
eminent domain and of “housing production subsidies”4—housing
tax credits—is necessary to rebuild the rental housing market in
New Orleans.  In a climate of appreciating markets, private devel-
opers do not have natural incentives to construct affordable rental
housing.5  If provided the proper financial motivation, prescient de-
velopers will step in and invest in the New Orleans and regional
rental markets.  There is no guarantee that developers will reap
huge profits in the affordable rental housing market, even under
optimal market conditions.  Certainly, post-natural disaster condi-
tions—widely dispersed populations, high unemployment levels,
devastated infrastructure, disorganization and finger-pointing, and
3. See Myron Orfield, Racial Integration and Community Revitalization: Apply-
ing the Fair Housing Act to the Low Income Housing Tax Credit, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1747, 1801-03 (2005).
4. Id. at 1796.
5. INITIATIVE FOR REGIONAL & COMMUNITY TRANSFORMATION, RUTGERS
UNIV., ENVISIONING A BETTER MISSISSIPPI: HURRICANE KATRINA AND MISSISSIPPI—
ONE YEAR LATER 37 (2006), available at http://www.naacp.org/news/press/Missis-
sippi.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) [hereinafter ENVISIONING A BETTER MISSISSIPPI].
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a lack of a unified vision of what the reconstructed built environ-
ment should be—pose even greater uncertainties for developers.
A thoughtful approach to eminent domain, combined with stra-
tegic use of housing subsidies, can complement other aspects of re-
gional comprehensive planning as New Orleans and the
surrounding communities move forward.  One of the most promis-
ing tools available to address rental housing needs is the Low In-
come Housing Tax Credit program (“LIHTC”).6  Created by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, the LIHTC is currently the most signifi-
cant program that seeks to meet poor citizens’ needs for rental
housing production and rehabilitation.7  LIHTCs increase the na-
tion’s rental housing stock for the poor by targeting high-income
taxpayers.8  The program “provides an incentive for the construc-
tion and rehabilitation of low income rental housing by lowering its
overall cost through the use of tax credits to developers and owners
of qualified rental projects.”9  The U.S. Department of the Trea-
sury administers the program in conjunction with the housing fi-
nance agencies of the states and some cities.10  Having produced
almost 1.3 million units of housing between 1987 and 2003, the
LIHTC has eclipsed the public housing program and holds great
promise as a program for increasing mixed-income housing and ra-
cial integration.11
Though the LIHTC is a potentially useful program for address-
ing New Orleans’s present rental housing needs, the LIHTC, if not
properly implemented, may also worsen the economic divide and
concentrated housing for the poor that characterized New Orleans
before Hurricane Katrina and the 2005 storm season.  Improper
6. 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2006).
7. See Florence Wagman Roisman, Keeping the Promise: Ending Racial Discrimi-
nation and Segregation in Federally Financed Housing, 48 HOW. L.J. 913, 926 (2005).
8. Id. at 927.
9. In re Adoption of 2003 Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation
Plan, 848 A.2d 1, 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), cert. denied, 861 A.2d 846 (N.J.
2004); see also Statutorily Mandated Designation of Difficult Development Areas for
Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 65 Fed. Reg. 57,526 (Sept. 22, 2000).
10. Roisman, supra note 7, at 927. R
11. JILL KHADDURI ET AL., ARE STATES USING THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX
CREDIT TO ENABLE FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN TO LIVE IN LOW POVERTY AND RA-
CIALLY INTEGRATED NEIGHBORHOODS? 1-2 (2006), available at http://www.prrac.org/
pdf/LIHTC_report_2006.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (report prepared for Poverty
and Race Research Action Council and the National Fair Housing Alliance); see also
Roisman, supra note 7, at 927 (discussing the approximate number of housing units R
the LIHTC program has added since its inception and discussing the LIHTC pro-
gram’s historic impact, or lack thereof, on ameliorating racially and economically seg-
regated housing).
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balancing of the allocation of housing tax credits can reinforce his-
toric race and class segregation and may have a blighting effect on
communities.12
Part II of this Article reviews the history of the New Orleans
rental housing market.  Parts  III and IV of this Article examine
eminent domain and LIHTC, highlighting the tensions inherent in
using these doctrines to assist in providing affordable housing.
Each part discusses potential tensions and social policy issues and
demonstrates that the proper combination of both promises a
stronger, more economically integrated, New Orleans.  Part V con-
cludes that by implementing the proposals set forth in this Article,
policymakers and citizens, partnering together, can rebuild a better
New Orleans.
II. A HISTORY OF THE NEW ORLEANS RENTAL
HOUSING MARKET
The subsidized and unsubsidized rental housing stock in the New
Orleans region must be sensibly redeveloped—a failure to do so
will result in consequences that reverberate throughout the econ-
omy and the social fabric of New Orleans.13  “In the market-driven,
status conscious society of [the] United States, affluent families live
in different neighborhoods than poor families . . . .”14  And, to the
extent this has resulted in an over-concentration of the poor and of
subsidized rental housing in areas of New Orleans, the redevelop-
ment efforts for the City should require other communities near
12. See, e.g., KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 11 (discussing state data on use of R
LIHTC to promote racial integration in housing); Robert Neuwirth, Renovation or
Ruin: Activists in Two States Make a Radical Charge: That America’s Biggest Program
to Finance Affordable Housing is Promoting Segregation and Blighting City Neighbor-
hoods, SHELTERFORCE ONLINE (Sept.-Oct. 2004), http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/
137/LIHTC.html (discussing community groups in New Jersey and Connecticut that
have challenged the implementation of the LIHTC program as racially biased and as
contributing to community blight).
13. E.g., THE ROAD HOME HOUSING PROGRAMS, ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT
FOR DISASTER RECOVERY FUNDS 17 (La. Recovery Auth. 2006), available at http://
www.doa.la.gov/cdbg/dr/plans/ActionPlan-Approved_06_04_11.pdf (last visited Mar.
7, 2007) [hereinafter ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT].  “All sectors of the economy have
reported a workforce shortage due to a lack of affordable housing.” Id.; see Joe Gyan,
Jr., N.O. Woman Blasts “Code Word” for Poor, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 15,
2006, at A1 (discussing the lack of trust in the government resulting from the 2005
storms and attempts to restore citizens’ trust through responsible housing assistance
programs).
14. DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGRE-
GATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 84 (1993).
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ204.txt unknown Seq: 5 31-MAY-07 9:57
2007] IMAGINING A BETTER NEW ORLEANS 693
New Orleans to integrate a modest portion of subsidized rental
housing units into their neighborhoods.
Approximately 82,000 rental housing units in southeast Louisi-
ana were destroyed or damaged last year by hurricanes and levee
breaks.15  More than 51,000 of these units were located in New Or-
leans.16  The devastation visited on the rental housing market was
particularly severe for those renting the nearly 18,000 subsidized
rental units located in New Orleans.17  Even before the 2005 hurri-
cane season, New Orleans experienced a serious housing af-
fordability problem,18 which was exacerbated by last year’s storms.
The affordable housing dilemma was more a function of low in-
comes than it was of high housing costs.  “Prior to Katrina, housing
expenditures for nearly half of renter households in the City ex-
ceeded 30% of income—the federal benchmark for determining if
a renter’s housing expenditures are burdensome . . . .  More than
85% of households making less than $20,000 spent in excess of that
level for housing.”19  Over two-thirds of the City’s rental housing,
both affordable and market-rate, has been damaged in the past
year, only worsening an already difficult situation.20
Two state agencies, the Louisiana Recovery Authority (“LRA”)
and the Louisiana Housing Finance Agency (“LHFA”), are pres-
ently working together to develop housing programs focused on
revitalizing the affordable housing market in New Orleans.21  To-
ward this end, the LRA adopted the Road Home Workforce and
15. ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 13, at 17; THE ROAD HOME RENTAL R
HOUSING PROGRAM, CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS 1 (2006), available at http://
www.bgr.org/Consequences_for_N.O._091506.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007)  [herein-
after CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS].
16. CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 1. R
17. Id.; see also Gyan, supra note 13 (stating that seventy percent of Louisiana’s R
“hurricane-related rental housing destruction” occurred in New Orleans); Sheila
Crowley, Presentation to Gulf Coast Recovery and Rebuilding Caucus, U.S. House of
Reps. (Mar. 7, 2006), available at http://www.nlihc.org/detail/article.cfm?article_id=34
15&id=72 (discussing, on behalf of the National Low Income Housing Coalition, the
shortage of affordable housing in the broader context of the Gulf Coast region and
estimating, conservatively, a loss of more than 214,400 affordable housing units in the
region last year from hurricanes and flooding).  Dr. Crowley also noted that, as of the
time of her briefing before the House of Representatives, there were in excess of
20,000 vacant rental units needing repair in New Orleans that were privately owned
and that this housing could be used to provide housing to distressed people by making
money for rehabilitation available to owners.  Crowley, supra.
18. See  CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 2. R
19. Id.
20. Id.; see also Crowley, supra note 17. R
21. See CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 2; see also The R
Road Home Program Homepage, http://www.road2la.org/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
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Affordable Rental Housing Program (“Road Home Program”).
The Road Home Program is the largest housing recovery program
in the United States.22  It assists homeowners and owners of rental
property through various compensation and loan programs.  The
Small Rental Property Program is a component of the overall
Road Home Program and is most relevant for this Article’s pur-
poses.23  The Small Rental Property Program’s main objective is to
assist in rebuilding properties containing between one and four
rental units and to encourage regional development of rental
properties, particularly focusing on small rental properties and
those with affordable rents.24
The LHFA is a state entity and administers housing tax credits.25
The LRA and the LHFA have committed to working together to-
ward the goal of developing mixed income housing and “ensur[ing]
the restoration of rental housing in the most heavily impacted par-
ishes” of New Orleans.26  These entities hope to motivate the pri-
vate sector, with the lure of financial incentives from the LIHTC
program and other programs, to build affordable housing and cre-
ate “new mixed-income communities that accommodate families
from across the income spectrum.”27
Though the aims of the LRA are laudable, its program has come
under significant criticism by a nonprofit, independent research or-
ganization, the Bureau of Governmental Research Housing Com-
mittee (“BGR”).28  Initially, the LRA proposed a mixed income
housing plan to “use the powerful incentives of the low income
housing tax credit program and [Community Development Block
Grant (“CDBG”)] funding to motivate developers to build new
22. See The Road Home Program Homepage, supra note 21.  Funding for the R
Road Home Program comes from Stafford Act Hazard Mitigation Grant Program
funds and Community Development Block Grant Program funds. ACTION PLAN
AMENDMENT, supra note 13, at 3. R
23. The Road Home Program, The Road Home Small Rental Property Program,
http://www.road2la.org/srap.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
24. See id.; see also WALLACE ROBERTS & TODD, LLC, ACTION PLAN FOR NEW
ORLEANS: THE NEW AMERICAN CITY (2006), available at http://www.asla.org/land/
nocityplan.pdf (prepared for Bring New Orleans Back Commission, Urban Planning
Committee) (presenting a “Rebuilding Neighborhoods Plan” to spur city-wide
redevelopment).
25. CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 1. R
26. ACTION PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 13, at 19. R
27. Id.
28. Id. But see Gyan, supra note 13 (contesting the accuracy of the BGR’s find- R
ings but stating that the objectives of the BGR are the same as those of the LRA—“a
deconcentration of poverty”).
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mixed income communities . . . .”29  But this initial proposal elicited
very little interest from private developers.  The LRA and the
LHFA responded by revising the initial program proposal.
Most notably, the [revisions] . . . reduce the emphasis on classic
mixed income development, which combines low income, subsi-
dized housing and market rate housing, reserving only 18% of
the tax credits for such development.  The remainder would be
available for the development of very low income units in 100%
low income housing tax credit developments.30
In its September 2006 report, the BGR issued a statement that
the current LRA programs threaten to exacerbate existing housing
problems in New Orleans and even create new ones.31  Specifically,
the BGR found that the LRA’s programs would result in concen-
trated poverty and the construction of housing stocks consisting en-
tirely of low-income housing tax credit units.32  From a regional
perspective, the plan would continue to disproportionately concen-
trate the area’s poor in Orleans Parish and would stymie the ability
of the tax base to grow sufficiently to meet citizens’ needs.33  Fi-
nally, the BGR was concerned that the LRA programs might leave
large portions of New Orleans blighted.34  New Orleans is speckled
with small rental properties in need of repair and the LRA focuses
on large-scale housing development, de-emphasizing smaller
projects.35
Before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans contained a dispropor-
tionate number of the region’s subsidized, low income, and rental
housing.36  The hurricane has given city planners and engineers an
29. CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 1. R
30. Id.; see Gyan, supra note 13. R
31. See CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 2; Gyan, supra note R
13. R
32. CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 2. R
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.; Gyan, supra note 13 (“The BGR report said 80 percent of New Orle- R
ans’ rental housing stock with major or severe damage—40,700 units—consisted of
small rental properties.  But BGR President and Chief Executive Officer Janet How-
ard told the authority board . . . that the Road Home program provides funding to
restore only 12,000 of those properties over a 10-year period.”); see also ACTION
PLAN AMENDMENT, supra note 13, at 23 (“Before the disaster, a large portion of very R
low income working families resided in single-family homes, ‘doubles’ and small,
multi-family buildings with ten or fewer units that were owned and operated by small-
scale landlords.”).
36. See CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 3. R
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans housed a disproportionate number
of the region’s rental units, low income households, and subsidized units.
While it was home to only 36% of all households in the region, New Orleans
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opportunity to allocate to the relevant regions a fair share of this
housing market.37  Comprehensive planning occurs not just on a
local level but must take into account regional concerns and con-
siderations.  Circumscribing the relevant region for planning pur-
poses can be challenging, and there is room within this dialogue for
reasonable minds to disagree.38  Parishes contiguous to the hardest
hit areas of New Orleans are certainly appropriate for inclusion in
a regional plan and must necessarily absorb some of the displaced
residents of poor and low-lying areas of New Orleans as part of
their contribution to the rebuilding process.39  Parishes and the mu-
nicipalities within parishes must cooperate and collaborate to both
tackle the common problems revealed and left by the 2005 storms
and to use available resources optimally.40
contained 48% of the renter households in the area.  It was home to 60% of
the region’s renter households with incomes below the poverty level, and to
70% of the region’s 26,000 subsidized units.  One out of five renter house-
holds in Orleans received some housing subsidy, a rate twice that found in
the suburban parishes.
Id.
37. A STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT 7 (Dep’t of Commerce, Advi-
sory Comm. on City Planning and Zoning 1928) [hereinafter STANDARD CITY PLAN-
NING ENABLING ACT].  This Act proposes model legislation pertaining to developing
a city plan, organizing a city planning commission, promulgating and controlling sub-
division growth and development, and directing regional growth planning. Id. at 44-
52; see also LOUISIANA RECOVERY & REBUIDING CONFERENCE, STARTING POINT 8-
15 (2005), available at http://lrrc.aia.org/SiteObjects/files/lrrc_startingpoint_crf.pdf
[hereinafter STARTING POINT] (suggesting similar elements to create community part-
nership and to aid in city planning and development).
38. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation, 64 WASH. U.
L.Q. 739, 756-57 (1986) (discussing the constitutional regional boundaries in the plan-
ning context but with reference to servitudes).
[I]n order to decide whether a package of servitudes is welfare maximizing,
we must consider whether we are trying to maximize only the welfare of
those in the tract covered by the servitudes, or the welfare of the suburb in
which the tract is located, or the welfare of the whole city or region, etc.  In
other words, in order to know whether a servitude package is optimal, one of
the things we have to know is whether it creates significant externalities, and
in order to know what are to count as externalities, we have to know the
“jurisdiction” over which we are maximizing welfare . . . . To make matters
worse, the optimal jurisdiction is likely to vary over time and there is no
reason to suppose that it will be coextensive with political boundaries, still
less with the extent of land owned by any given grantor-developer imposing
servitudes.
Id.
39. See, e.g., S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 456 A.2d
390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel Twp., 336 A.2d
713 (N.J. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) .
40. See generally STARTING POINT, supra note 37.  “Parishes and municipalities R
must put aside old divisions and eliminate barriers to regional planning and coopera-
tion.” Id. at 4.
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III. EMINENT DOMAIN AS PART OF A REBUILDING STRATEGY
Broadly understood, the police power allows state and federal
governments to regulate private citizens’ property and liberty.41
Zoning to prevent development in flood plains is an example of
one of the oldest and most established uses of the police power to
prevent public harm, essentially protecting the public from itself.
Floods were originally seen as natural disasters to be avoided by
dams and levees . . . . [P]ioneering work on flood control gradu-
ally convinced cities and the federal government that it would
be more efficient to recognize that floods are positive natural
processes and that humans should adapt to them by not putting
costly permanent structures in flood plains.42
Governments have long recognized that they are safely within
their police power discretion to use zoning and even eminent do-
main to prevent loss of life and property among those who would
be inclined to ignore the perils of developing and residing in flood
plains.  Furthermore, federal policy even requires flood plain zon-
ing.43  The above is a clear example of exercising police power to
41. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
42. A. Dan Tarlock, Local Government Protection of Biodiversity: What is Its
Niche?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 555, 576 (1993) (citations omitted).
43. Id. at 576-77.
Zoning ordinances that prevent construction in one hundred-year flood
plains are some of the earliest examples of zoning to preserve open space
and promote environmental objectives . . . .  Flood plain zoning was initially
puzzling to courts and commentators, because the fiscal benefits of land use
controls were not well understood, and thus the protection of persons from
their own folly seemed beyond the nuisance rationale.  Flood plain zoning is
now federal policy and has been uniformly endorsed by courts as a legiti-
mate exercise of the police power. The standard justifications are the “pro-
tection of individuals who might develop or occupy . . . land despite apparent
danger to life or property; protection of others from damage caused by the
obstruction of the natural flood flow; and protection of the community as a
whole from the public expenditures otherwise necessary to safeguard prop-
erty located within a flood plain.”
Id. (internal citations omitted); see generally David G. Tucker & Alfred O. Bragg, III,
Florida’s Law of Storms: Emergency Management, Local Government, and the Police
Power, 30 STETSON L. REV. 837 (2001) (discussing the police power in the context of
states of emergency).  Specifically as it pertains to New Orleans, when it became clear
that houses sustaining substantial damage (defined as houses requiring repairs that
cost more than fifty percent of the cost to completely rebuild) would have to be built
to one hundred year elevation standards in order to remain eligible for the federal
government’s flood insurance program, New Orleans authorities allowed many home-
owners to appeal their assessed damage percentage seeking a downward revision to
avoid having to elevate the homes they were rebuilding.  When FEMA stated that all
new and rebuilt houses should be raised an additional three feet above grade, New
Orleans officials resisted strongly and have delayed passing a local ordinance imple-
menting the FEMA requirement.  FEMA and the Louisiana Recovery Authority,
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accomplish general welfare goals.  Regardless of one’s personal or
political views regarding how and to what extent New Orleans
should be rebuilt, comprehensive planning will be necessary.44
Eminent domain and zoning are crucial aspects of comprehensive
planning.
“James Madison’s original intent in framing the Fifth Amend-
ment’s Taking Clause45 was to force government to be more effi-
cient and to protect citizens from overly aggressive governmental
intrusions upon their land.”46  Madison’s and others’ high regard
for physical rights to private property reflected prevailing notions
that land, as the most treasured form of private property, was the
gateway to individual autonomy and a necessary prerequisite for
full societal participation.47  A thoughtful and targeted use of emi-
nent domain and of LIHTCs to relocate and disperse affordable
rental housing among neighboring parishes in the New Orleans re-
gion can help stabilize the plight of the working- and middle-
classes and dissuade predatory investor speculation48 while simul-
taneously providing appropriate safeguards to cherished private
property rights.
though, may require adherence to the above stated requirement as a condition for
qualifying to receive Community Bloc Grants. See Brian Thevenot, Finally, Rules for
Rebuilding, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Apr. 13, 2006, at 1.
44. Nicholas Lemann, In the Ruins, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/09/12/050912/ta_talk_lemann.
45. The Fifth Amendment, at one time, was held to apply exclusively to the fed-
eral government and not to the states.  The United States Supreme Court, in Chicago,
Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, held that the just compensation requirement of
the Fifth Amendment was an essential element of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process guarantees and applied to the states.  166 U.S. 226, 238-39 (1897); see also
Kenneth B. Bley, Substantive Due Process and Land Use: The Alternative to a Takings
Claim, in TAKINGS:  LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
AFTER DOLAN AND LUCAS 289, 291 (David L. Callies ed., 1996) (stating that there is
an instant relationship between the Takings and Due Process Clauses as the Four-
teenth Amendment makes the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applicable to
the states).
46. Carol Necole Brown, Taking the Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Anal-
ysis of the Survival of Takings Claims After Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REV. 7, 7
(2003); see generally William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Tak-
ings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 (1995).  Professor
Treanor explained that James Madison, who proposed the Fifth Amendment’s Tak-
ings Clause, originally intended the clause to mandate compensation when the gov-
ernment took property physically, as opposed to by regulation.  Treanor, supra,  at
791.
47. Brown, supra note 46, at 7 n.3 (citing Treanor, supra note 46, at 821). R
48. See, e.g., Ngai Pindell, Fear and Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local
Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 546 (2006) (discussing the use of housing
moratoria as “anti-speculation measures applicable to residential property”).
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One writer noted the following trends in the aftermath of natural
disasters:
[T]here are two seemingly opposing points of view about how to
rebuild destroyed communities.  On one hand, urban planners,
real estate developers and architects tend to see solutions
mainly in terms of demolition and large-scale redevelopment
projects.  On the other hand, property owners look at the wreck-
age . . . and ask, “How can I fix this?”49
Some frame the initial and subsequent planning efforts in New
Orleans in a similar type of bilateral context, the familiar “us
against them” paradigm.50  But the historical and virtually certain
future environmental challenges facing New Orleans demand a
more layered and integrated approach.  Eminent domain can be
useful when attempting to rebuild urban areas devastated by natu-
ral disaster.  Citizens rely upon government to secure the public
welfare when an area is altered by natural disaster.  Local and state
governments should employ responsible land use planning and de-
velopment policies toward achieving the goal of redeveloping and
reconstituting communities in pursuit of the public welfare.  This
redevelopment effort should account for housing the poor in a
49. Peter Werwath, Two Paradigms for Renewal: Development Versus Property
Owner Empowerment, SOC. POL’Y (2005-2006), available at http://www.socialpolicy.
org/index.php?id=1640 (last visited Mar. 7, 2007).
50. See, e.g., infra note 85 (discussing the concerns voiced by a spokesman for a R
coalition of activists organizations that the destruction of New Orleans will be used as
an opportunity to gentrify the City and permanently displace many of its minority and
economically disadvantaged citizens); Gordon Russell & Frank Donze, Let Residents
Decide; Well-populated Areas Wouldn’t Get Buyout, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans),
Dec. 19, 2005, at 1.  The Urban Land Institute (“ULI”) recommended a plan for de-
veloping New Orleans that prompted opposition from some African-American lead-
ers who were concerned that the plan might result in the disproportionate
condemnation of minority neighborhoods.  The ULI discouraged redevelopment “in
various hard-hit neighborhoods—from eastern New Orleans and the Lower 9th Ward
to parts of Gentilly and Lakeview—[which] brought a [cold reception] from political
leaders in those areas.”  Russell & Donze, supra; see also Gyan, supra note 13. R
While [Louisiana Recovery Authority] members and authority Executive
Director Andy Kopplin were discussing two “road Home” rental housing
programs and an accompanying objective of not replicating what a Road
Home handout called “pre-storm excessive concentrations of poverty,” New
Orleanian Elizabeth Cook sprang to her feet and gave the board an earful.
Cook, who lives in the city’s Bywater area, yelled out from the audience at
the Belle Chasse Auditorium.  She said not repeating concentrations of pov-
erty is a “code word” for keeping New Orleans’ displaced poor from re-
turning to the city.
Russell & Donze, supra.
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manner that is consistent with the Federal Fair Housing Act51 and
state fair housing laws.52
For many homeowners, Hurricane Katrina performed a wel-
comed service by demolishing or severely damaging the rental
housing stock and making New Orleans inaccessible for low-in-
come tenants.53  Renters’ incomes are typically less than homeown-
ers’ making them more dependent on readily available affordable
housing options.54  The consequences to these citizens of New Or-
leans’s depleted rental housing stock are worsened by the appreci-
ating demand in the land and housing market in the City, mostly
attributable to land investors and others who are speculating about
the future of New Orleans.55
The interest in buying, selling and renovating has been a bright
spot since the last months of 2005, and has confounded some
people who thought the flooding would cripple the housing mar-
ket for years.  But it is just one of many counterintuitive con-
51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31 (2000).
52. See, e.g., Louisiana Equal Housing Opportunity Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 51:2601-14 (2006).
The legislature finds and declares that persons in this state who seek a
place to live should be able to find such housing whenever it is available.
Further, in many localities there may be housing shortages.  All persons
should therefore be able to compete for available housing on an open, fair,
and equitable basis, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial
status, or national origin.
It is therefore declared to be the policy of Louisiana that there is a legiti-
mate governmental interest in protecting the welfare of the people of Louisi-
ana by enacting equal housing opportunity legislation to discourage
discriminatory housing practices.
It is the policy of the state of Louisiana to provide, within state and federal
constitutional limitations, for fair and equal housing opportunity throughout
the state.
Id. § 51:2602 (emphasis added).
53. See Susan Saulny & Gary Rivlin, Renewal Money for New Orleans Bypasses
Renters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2006, at A14.
54. Cf. ENVISIONING A BETTER MISSISSIPPI, supra note 5, at 12-14  (discussing dis- R
parate levels of home ownership and rebuilding effort between lower-income minor-
ity areas and wealthier areas).
55. See, e.g., Laura Maggi, Housing Tax Credits Compromise Ok’d: Mixed-Income
Plans to Get Future Money, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Aug. 24, 2006, at 2 (dis-
cussing damage to New Orleans’s rental housing market and the use of federal tax
credits to address the problem); Gary Rivlin, Apre`s Le De´luge, Moi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
5, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 68-76, 128, 199 [hereinafter Rivlin, Apre`s Le De´luge]; Su-
san Saulny, Investors Lead Home Sale Boom in New Orleans, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2006, at A1.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\34-2\FUJ204.txt unknown Seq: 13 31-MAY-07 9:57
2007] IMAGINING A BETTER NEW ORLEANS 701
trasts that are defining the area and making easy predictions
unreliable.56
Many apartments that were once eye-sores, negatively impacting
neighboring property values, are now gone and neighbors of these
buildings would like to see them replaced with open spaces (i.e.,
parks) and other niceties.57  Presently, most of the housing policy
efforts by federal, state, and local actors have focused on owner-
occupied housing needs, leaving many concerned that rental hous-
ing and renters will not receive adequate consideration in the re-
building process.58  Changing the worst of New Orleans without
destroying the opportunity for all interested citizens to return pro-
vides valuable opportunities for local governments to engage in re-
sponsible planning that adequately addresses the affordable rental
housing crisis in New Orleans.59
The Urban Land Institute has recommended that New Orleans
delay redeveloping many of the most severely impacted areas of
the City.60  Some African-American leaders object to the Insti-
tute’s recommendation and are concerned that the minority neigh-
borhoods could be negatively impacted in a disproportionate
manner by condemnation and, relatedly, eminent domain.61  If re-
sidents are discouraged by these prospects of long-term displace-
ment, they may be more inclined to sell land to speculators at
56. Saulny, supra note 55, at A1.  “The higher prices are largely due to an increase R
in value in suburban areas, many of which were not heavily flooded, or in dry areas of
New Orleans.  But flooded houses in the city are being bought as well, often at deep
discounts of as much as $50 a square foot less than they would have sold for before
the hurricane.” Id.
57. See Saulny & Rivlin, supra note 53, at A14. R
58. See Crowley, supra note 17 (expressing concern for the devastation to New R
Orleans’s rental housing stock).
59. See Saulny & Rivlin, supra note 53, at A14 (stating that nearly one-half of New R
Orleans’s residents were renters prior to Hurricane Katrina); Crowley, supra note 17 R
(discussing the devastation to New Orleans’s rental housing stock). But see Fresh Air:
At Odds Over Bush’s Approach to Katrina Costs (WHYY radio broadcast Oct. 6,
2005) (discussing the President’s economic policy with Paul Krugman and Stuart But-
ler).  Mr. Butler suggests that community-wide action, rather than a strong govern-
ment hand, is the best source of leadership for rebuilding New Orleans and designing
a new built environment. Id.
60. See Martha Carr, Experts Include Science in Rebuilding Equation: Politics No-
ticeably Absent from Plan, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 25, 2005, at 1.  A
panel of more than fifty members of the Urban Land Institute, all land use experts,
“emphasized that all property owners in areas that will not be immediately rebuilt
should be bought out at pre-Katrina market values.” Id.; see Russell & Donze, supra
note 50 (discussing Urban Land Institute recommendations for rebuilding New Orle- R
ans); see also supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (discussing all of the factors
that are working together to price poor renters out of New Orleans).
61. See Russell & Donze, supra note 50. R
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suppressed prices62 and, in so doing, miss out on the actual con-
demnation of their property.  They may also miss out, however, on
realizing the pre-Katrina market value of their property as opposed
to the post-Katrina prices that developers and land speculators are
paying.63
Fairness and justice should be at the forefront of the eminent
domain debate, especially when vulnerable cities and their citizens
are struggling to recover from catastrophes.  The interests of indi-
vidual private property owners and of communities in their entirety
must be balanced.  The world is an evolving place, and govern-
ments need the authority to adjust economic burdens within the
boundaries of fairness for all of their citizens.  No longer do citi-
zens merely seek abundant roads, an ample supply of fire stations,
and safe schools.64  Citizens are increasingly demanding more from
62. See, e.g., Gordon Russell, 6 Months Later, Recovery Gaining Focus; City May
be Near Turning Point, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Feb. 26, 2006, at 1.
Dave Silverman, a Xavier University communications professor who lost his
job in the wake of Katrina and has moved to Colorado, is looking to get rid
of his Gentilly home.
. . .
Silverman figures he would get about $42,000 for a house that was worth
$250,000 before Katrina.
And that would be fine with him.
Id.; see also Saulny & Rivlin, supra note 53 (discussing the difficulties public housing R
occupants and other poor people are experiencing in returning to New Orleans, in
part due to a lack of affordable housing and significantly increasing rental prices in
the housing market); e.g., Rivlin, Apre`s Le De´luge, supra note 55, at 74.  Rivlin’s arti- R
cle describes Patrick Quinn, a New Orleans native and businessman who saw Hurri-
cane Katrina as an opportunity to acquire vast amounts of real estate, both
commercial and residential.  Rivlin, Apre`s Le De´luge, supra note 55, at 68-70.  Within
two weeks after the hurricane, Mr. Quinn rented a luxury bus, his new office on
wheels, and along with a driver, his assistant, and other employees, began driving
around New Orleans making offers on properties of interest. Id. at 70-71.
Patrick Quinn acknowledged that there’s a fine line between an entrepre-
neur and a vulture.  Borrowing a term coined during Reconstruction, he al-
lowed that there was a question of whether he was a hero or a “scallawag”—
a son of the South exploiting a chaotic and defeated region.  Was he working
to revitalize his city, or was he taking advantage of its vulnerability?
Id. at 74.
63. See Shaheen Pasha, Property Grabs and the Gulf: Local Governments Will
Likely Use Eminent Domain to Rebuild; Who Will That Help?, CNN/MONEY, Oct. 5,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/10/05/news/economy/eminent_domain_katrina/in-
dex.htm.  Bart Peterson, the mayor of Indianapolis and an officer of the National
League of Cities, opined that eminent domain would have an important role in re-
building New Orleans and “added that a homeowner would be better off taking a
government buyout at market value than falling into the hands of land exploiters
looking to buy land cheap and sell high.” Id.
64. See Jessica LeVeen Farr, Eminent Domain and Economic Development: Strik-
ing a Balance, PARTNERS IN COMMUNITY & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (2006), availa-
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government and as government strains to meet these needs, it must
do so in light of important justice concerns that attend the redistri-
bution of property.
Recently, private property owners unsuccessfully opposed joint
urban development projects between government and private de-
velopers—“economic development takings”65—at least at the fed-
eral level.  “According to the National League of Cities, land
acquired through eminent domain for economic development is
usually designated for one of four purposes: to cure blighted condi-
tions; to clear title of vacant property; to resolve compensation dis-
putes; or as part of an overall redevelopment plan for an area.”66
These projects often involve the use of eminent domain and the
transfer of private property to private developers in the pursuit of
plans that serve public uses.67  Following the United States Su-
preme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London,68 the
Louisiana legislature and its electorate amended the Louisiana
State Constitution in a manner that arguably curtails, to a signifi-
cant extent, the ability of government to acquire property through
eminent domain and engage in public-private economic develop-
ment projects using the acquired property.69  Article I, Section 4 of
the Louisiana Constitution states that, subject to certain excep-
tions,70  “property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its
ble at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=CECC668EA-5056-9F1A-E230
246B4D66FEB1&method=display (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (published by the Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Atlanta).  “Eminent domain has most frequently been used by
local governments to acquire land for such purposes as new roads, infrastructure im-
provements, civic buildings or schools.” Id.
65. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
66. Farr, supra note 64. R
67. See, e.g., Ryan Chittum, Eminent Domain: Is It Only Hope for Inner Cities?,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2005, at B1 (quoting one private property owner in East St. Louis
as stating that “[e]minent domain is a horrible law . . . .  I feel that it’s a little bit worse
than communism”), see also Kelo, 545 U.S. 469; Poletown Neighborhood Council v.
City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 (1981) (per curium), overruled by County of Wayne v.
Hathcock, 471 Mich. 445 (2004).  The court in Poletown held that the condemnation
of private property and its transfer to General Motors Corp. for construction of an
assembly plant was not a taking of private property for private use but rather for a
public purpose. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 628-29. More than twenty years later, the
court overruled its decision in Poletown: “Because Poletown’s conception of a public
use—that of ‘alleviating unemployment and revitalizing the economic base of the
community’—has no support in the Court’s eminent domain jurisprudence before the
Constitution’s ratification, its interpretation of ‘public use’ . . . cannot reflect the com-
mon understanding of that phrase . . . .” County of Wayne, 471 Mich. at 482-83.
68. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
69. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
70. Id. Article I, Section 4(B)(1) excepts from this provision expropriations au-
thorized by Louisiana Constitution Article VI, § 21 that permits expropriation of cer-
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political subdivisions: (a) for predominant use by any private per-
son or entity; or (b) for transfer of ownership to any private person
or entity.”71  The provision further states that “[p]roperty shall not
be taken or damaged by any private entity authorized by law to ex-
propriate, except for a public and necessary purpose and with just
compensation paid to the owner . . . .”72 The impact of this consti-
tutional amendment on New Orleans’s recovery and on this Arti-
cle’s proposals is ambiguous.  What is certain is that “[p]ublic-
private partnerships will be critical to augment the city’s resources
for rebuilding.”73
Eminent domain is sometimes employed to address needs arising
from catastrophes and, in these instances, a broad and permissive
understanding of eminent domain helps government.  Particularly
when strategizing to rebuild urban areas that have been devastated
by disasters, such as New Orleans, traditional police power juris-
prudence permits takings decisions to be made based upon long-
established police power principles and obviates the need to rely
on nuanced or vague cases of constitutional interpretation.74  Citi-
zens rely upon government to secure the public welfare when an
area is altered by natural disaster.  Local and state governments
should employ responsible land use planning and development pol-
icies following disaster situations.  The goal is to redevelop and re-
constitute communities so as to best provide for the public welfare
and to avoid spot redevelopment, the epitome of poor planning.
Instances of catastrophe and disaster reflect the most traditional
uses of eminent domain—that of slum clearance and urban re-
newal—and are different from pure economic development
takings.
“An intelligent city plan thinks impartially for all parts of the city
at the same time, and does not forget the greater needs of to-
morrow in the press of today.”75  Exercise of the police power and
the related power of eminent domain may be necessary if govern-
ment is to function properly and serve the public’s best interest.  It
tain industrial sites in order to encourage the location of additional industrial business
to the State. Id.  art. VI, § 21(A)(b).
71. Id. art. I, § 4(B) (emphasis added).
72. Id. art. I, § 4(B)(4) (emphasis added).
73. Farr, supra note 64. R
74. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Six Myths About Kelo, PROP. & PROB., Jan.-
Feb. 2006, at 19.
75. Richard M. Rosan, Rebuilding New Orleans and the Gulf Coast—A Long
Look Ahead, URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, http://www.uli.org/AM/Template.cfm?Sec-
tion=Home&CONTENTID=37417&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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is well established that government may regulate by exercise of its
police power for purposes of maintaining public health, safety,
morals, and general welfare.76  With New Orleans’s history of natu-
ral disaster and the likelihood of recurrence, smart planning and
land use are especially necessary.  Katrina laid bare the disparities
that have affected many poor residents for decades.77  This history
is partly responsible for the fear of some that residents of the esti-
mated 150,000 flooded homes,78 many located in predominantly
poor, minority, low-lying areas will be forced out and their neigh-
borhoods gentrified.  This fear was legitimized when investors and
prospectors quickly began contacting local real estate agents trying
to purchase habitable and flooded homes while residents and evac-
uees were still reeling from the devastation of Hurricane Katrina.79
There are short term and long term costs of rebuilding New Or-
leans.  These costs may justify the condemnation of significant
amounts of private property that are especially prone to flood
hazards, either because of their location or because of their popula-
tion density.  The police power in American constitutional law has
been a source of ambiguity and of some confusion;80 even with its
76. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (stating that the police
power is one of government’s most essential powers and one least susceptible to limi-
tation); STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT, supra note 37, at 7 n.8 (empow- R
ering municipalities to implement a municipal plan and acknowledging that city
governments should seek to promote “the public health, convenience, safety, and wel-
fare . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ZONING: A STAN-
DARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT
ZONING REGULATIONS 4 n.3 (rev. ed. 1926) (stating that “[t]he main pillars on which
the police power rests are these four, viz, health, safety, morals, and general welfare.
It is wise, therefore, to limit the purposes of this enactment to these four”).
77. See, e.g., Press Release, Amer. Chem. Soc’y, Post-Katrina: Lead in Disturbed
Soil May Pose Heightened Health Risk (Dec. 14, 2005), available at http://
www.texastech.edu/neworleanspollution/pressRelease2.php; Martha Carr, National
Experts Focus on N.O.; Los Angeles Gathering Takes Holistic Approach, TIMES-PICA-
YUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 4, 2005, at 1.
While most city residents remain focused on when they can return to their
homes and rebuild on their property, [Urban Land Institute] members said
residents need to begin thinking about where that property might fit into the
city’s long-term redevelopment.  Many warned it will take at least 10 years
for the city to build enough housing to restore the city’s original population.
Carr, supra; see also Pasha, supra note 63; David Streitfeld, Speculators Rushing in as R
the Water Recedes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2005, at A1; Liza Featherstone, The Other
Side of the Big Easy, GRIST MAG., Sept. 12, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/story/25278
(stating that many of the toxins that now pollute New Orleans’s streets are the prod-
uct of environmental injustice and may make many parts of the city uninhabitable for
years).
78. See Streitfeld, supra note 77, at A2. R
79. See Rivlin, Apre`s Le De´luge, supra note 55, at 68-76, 128, 199. R
80. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 46, at 7 (providing a history of eminent domain). R
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“shadowy” history though, the police power provides virtually une-
quivocal authority for governments to exercise their takings power
in cases of widespread devastation such as this.
IV. THE LOW INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT PROGRAM
In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v.
City of New London,81 in which the Court adopted a broad defini-
tion of public use and upheld the constitutionality of economic de-
velopment takings, some fear that eminent domain will be used in
favor of extensive commercial redevelopment of New Orleans.82
Others fear that property will be condemned to create flood plains,
displacing residents who wish to return and rebuild,83  and that re-
sidents will be “left to negotiate their own deal with private inter-
est, unaided by legislative protections against market forces.”84
Even if the eminent domain power is used to rebuild residential
communities, there is concern that the housing developed will only
be affordable to a certain segment of the population, leaving the
poor and working class with no place to which to return.85  Devel-
opers and investors will require incentives to participate in the re-
development of affordable rental housing in New Orleans.86  The
81. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
82. See Emily Chamlee & Daniel Rothschild, Government Dines on Katrina
Leftovers, WALL ST. J., June 15, 2006, at A15.
83. Robert Aalberts, From the Editor-In-Chief—Hurricane Katrina: Will New Or-
leans Real Estate Emerge from the Devastation?, 34 REAL EST. L.J. i (2005) .  Aalberts
states that this action would be “politically explosive involving issues of rich versus
poor, as well as accusations of racism.” Id.
84. Wendy B. Scott, From an Act of God to the Failure of Man: Hurricane Katrina
and the Economic Recovery of New Orleans, 51 VILL. L. REV. 581, 587 (2006).  Pro-
fessor Scott, of Tulane Law School, was evacuated to Houston and eventually ended
up in Carrollton, Georgia. Id. at 583 n.5.
85. A spokesperson for the Community Labor United, a coalition of activist orga-
nizations, stated:
The people of New Orleans will not go quietly into the night, scattering
across this country to become homeless in countless other cities while fed-
eral relief funds are funneled into rebuilding casinos, hotels, chemical plants
and the wealthy white districts of New Orleans like the French Quarter and
the Garden District.  We will not stand idly by while this disaster is used as
an opportunity to replace our homes with newly built mansions and condos
in a gentrified New Orleans.
Andrew Pollack, Socialist Action Article, THE PEOPLE’S HURRICANE RELIEF FUND &
OVERSIGHT COALITION, http://cluonline.live.radicaldesigns.org/?page_id=58 (last vis-
ited Mar. 28, 2006).
86. Marc Schnitzer, a member of the Affordable Housing Tax Credit Coalition,
states that the uncertain market will make it difficult to finance housing in the area
impacted by Hurricane Katrina.  “If you were just looking to the private sector, you
are going to have people building luxury condos on the Gulf Coast where they will
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uncertainty of the City’s economic and population base provides an
unpredictable market in which to invest and develop projects that
do not provide for a high rate of return.  Low income housing tax
credits, used in conjunction with land acquired by eminent domain,
can provide the added incentive to developers and investors to
build much-needed rental housing affordable to returning re-
sidents, including residents who are part of the workforce essential
to the recovering City’s economic base.  Equitable redevelopment
of New Orleans, however, also requires careful consideration of
the location of these LIHTC projects. To that end, the state agency
responsible for the program should use an allocation approach that
disperses projects throughout the region in mixed-income neigh-
borhoods, leading to a decrease in the racial and economic isola-
tion characteristic of pre-Katrina New Orleans.
A. How the Program Works
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit program was created as a
tax incentive to increase the construction and rehabilitation of af-
fordable rental housing units.87  Unlike many of the nation’s hous-
ing programs, the LIHTC is administered by the Department of
Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) with the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) having
oversight of specific portions.88  The program provides an income
tax credit to developers of qualified housing projects who usually
sell the credits to investors for equity in the property.  The tax
credit lowers the financing costs of the project to the developer,
allowing the developer to build a project with units that offer lower
rents to qualified tenants.89
1. Allocation of Credits
The IRS allocates housing tax credits to states through state
housing finance agencies.90  Each state is awarded credits based on
make money.  They will not be building affordable housing without the benefit of the
tax credits.”  Michael Corkery, Housing Tax Credit May Be New Orleans’s Answer,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Oct. 17, 2005, http://www.realestatejournal.com/regionalnews/
20051017-corkery.html (quoting Marc Schnitzer).
87. The credits were included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,
100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
88. The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development designates the Difficult
Development Areas.  26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(iii) (2004).  HUD also reviews the
Qualified Allocation Planss submitted by each local or state agency charged with ad-
ministering the program. Id. § 42(l)(3).
89. The credit is claimed over a ten-year period. Id. § 42(b)(2)(B).
90. Id. § 42(h)(3)(B).
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its populations.91  Credits not awarded are placed in a national pool
and then distributed to states that apply for the excess credits.92
Once the state reaches its credit ceiling, its housing finance
agency awards tax credits to a project based on a Qualified Alloca-
tion Plan (“QAP”).  In the plan, the state agency sets forth the
criteria by which it will judge projects competing for the credits.93
Thus, through the QAP, “state policy makers are making critical
choices about rental housing policy that affect the well-being of in-
dividual households and the economic health of the state’s metro-
politan areas.”94
The QAP is reviewed by HUD as part of a state consolidated
plan for Section 8 and public housing programs.  By law, the QAP
must give priority to projects that will accomplish three objectives:
(1) to serve the lowest-income families; (2) to be structured to re-
main affordable for the longest period of time; and (3) to contrib-
ute to a community revitalization plan.95  Both for-profit
organizations and nonprofit organizations can compete for the tax
credits to develop these projects.  Federal law requires that at least
ten percent of a state’s housing credits be allocated to projects in
which a nonprofit organization owns an interest in the project and
materially participates in the operation and development.96  It is
important to note that land acquisition costs are not included in the
eligible basis for determination of the credit.97
Developers of LIHTC projects can and do sell tax credits to in-
vestors to provide equity to fund the development.  The investor
then receives the tax credit against its federal tax liability, generat-
ing a return on its investment.98  The vast majority of investors in
91. Id. § 42(h)(3)(C).
92. Id. § 42(h)(3)(D).
93. Id. § 42(m)(1)(B)(i).
94. JILL KHADDURI & DAVID RODDA, MAKING THE BEST USE OF YOUR LIHTC
DOLLARS: A PLANNING PAPER FOR STATE POLICY MAKERS 3 (2004), available at
http://www.novoco.com/low_income_housing/resource_files/research_center/LIHTC
Dollars.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007) (report prepared for the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research).
95. 26 U.S.C. § 42(m)(l)(B)(ii).
96. Id. § 42(h)(5)(A).  Some argue that nonprofit entities develop projects that set
lower rents than for-profit entities. See Megan J. Ballard, Profiting from Poverty: The
Competition Between For-Profit and Nonprofit Developers for Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 211, 239 (2003).  Ballard asserts that nonprofit develop-
ers offer more social services to tenants and tend to meet the housing needs of larger
families better.  Id.
97. 26 U.S.C. § 42(e)(2)(b).
98. See PAMELA J. JACKSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,  AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO THE DESIGN OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 4 (2006), available
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LIHTC projects are corporate investors.99  Financial institutions
subject to the Community Revinvestment Act (“CRA”) make up
approximately forty-three percent of investors.100  The investment
is attractive to financial institutions regulated under the CRA since
an investment in LIHTC can meet the investment test of the
CRA.101
2. Qualified Projects and Eligible Tenants
A developer can qualify a project for the LIHTC through one of
two tests.  Under the “20-50 test,” a qualified low-income housing
project must have twenty percent or more of the residential units in
the project occupied by individuals whose income is fifty percent or
less of the area’s median gross income.102  Alternatively, a devel-
oper may elect to qualify a project by having at least forty percent
of the units occupied by individuals with income of sixty percent or
less of the area’s median gross income (the “40-60 test”).103  Once
the election is made, the developer cannot change the test.104  Fur-
thermore, a developer must commit the building to affordability
for fifteen years to be eligible for the credit.105  Failure to maintain
the required minimum number of low-income units could result in
the loss of tax credits and its recapture by the IRS.106
The project must also meet a gross rent restriction with respect
to each unit such that the gross rent of a unit does not exceed thirty
percent of the income limitation applicable to the unit.  Gross rent
does not include any Section 8 payments or other comparable
rental assistance.107  The residential units must be available for use




100. Id. at 5.  The LIHTC has been called an “excellent investment” for banks. See
Catherine Such, Low Income Housing Tax Credits, COMMUNITY INVESTMENTS (Fed.
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, CA), Mar. 2002, at 5, available at http:/
/www.frbsf.org/publications/community/investments/cra02-2/lowincome.pdf.
101. The “investment test” evaluates a bank’s record of fulfilling the credit needs of
the community in which it is located.  One of the criteria of the test is responsiveness
to investment to community development needs. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.23(e)(3) (2006).
102. 26 U.S.C. § 42(g)(1)(A).
103. Id. § 42(g)(1)(B).
104. Id.
105. Id. § 42(h)(6)(D).
106. Id. § 42(j).
107. Id. § 42(g)(2)(A).
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for classes of tenants so long as no HUD nondiscrimination poli-
cies are violated.108
B. Segregation, Poverty, and the LIHTC
One question about the LIHTC recurs: Do the credits concen-
trate low-income families in segregated neighborhoods with high
rates of poverty?109  States, through their QAPs, could implement
policies that create mixed-income, racially integrated communities
with LIHTC projects, but the evidence suggests that they are doing
otherwise.110  A variety of factors converge to lead to racial segre-
gation and poverty concentration, including persistent racial dis-
crimination in housing and statutory incentives to develop in
certain tracts.111  Priorities under the QAPs and the statutory in-
centives must be reordered for the LIHTC credits to be useful in
the racially-charged, class-conscious redevelopment of New
Orleans.
1. Evidence of Racial Segregation and Poverty Concentration
Several studies support the conclusion that current policies regu-
lating the LIHTC program promote racial segregation and concen-
trate poverty in neighborhoods in which LIHTC projects are
located.  One study using data from the 2000 census and from
HUD on the location of federally-assisted project-based units
found that LIHTC neighborhoods contain disproportionately more
Blacks.112  Blacks make up fifteen percent of metropolitan re-
sidents, but account for twenty-six percent of residents in LIHTC
neighborhoods.113  According to the authors of this study, the pat-
tern of racial segregation is even more pronounced in the South
and Midwest.114  Another study found that only a few states place
more than half of their LIHTC projects in census tracts with minor-
108. I.R.S. Notice 89-6, 1989-1 C.B. 625.
109. Lance Freeman, Siting Affordable Housing: Location and Neighborhood
Trends of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Developments in the 1990s, BROOKINGS
INST., Mar. 2004, at 1, 7, available at http://www.brookings.edu/urban/pubs/
20040405_Freeman.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2007); see also, e.g., KHADDURI ET AL.,
supra note 11. R
110. See Freeman, supra note 109, at 1 (finding that LIHTC neighborhoods contain R
disproportionate shares of black residents).
111. E.g., 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C) (detailing increased credit for building in Diffi-
cult Development Areas).
112. See Freeman, supra note 109, at 7. R
113. Id. Freeman concludes that programs such as the LIHTC do little to alleviate
the isolation of blacks in segregated neighborhoods.  Id.
114. Id.
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ity population rates less than half the rate for the metropolitan ar-
eas.115  It also found that almost ninety percent of the LIHTC units
located in census tracts with a ten percent or less poverty rate were
also in census tracts with more than half of the population identi-
fied as non-Hispanic white.116  The authors of this study concluded
that “[p]roviding less racially isolated housing opportunities, per
se, does not appear to be a priority for states as they administer the
LIHTC program.”117
Both of the studies cited above report on the racial composition
of neighborhoods in which LIHTC projects are located.  Neither
reports on the actual racial or ethnic composition of individual
LIHTC projects as data on the characteristics of individual house-
holds is not systematically collected and monitored.118  Thus, the
opportunity for people of color and low-income families to live in
LIHTC projects in low-poverty, racially desegregated areas may in
fact be unknown.119
2. A Fair Housing Act Challenge to a QAP
A QAP was challenged for funding LIHTC projects in a manner
which perpetuated racial discrimination in a 2004 New Jersey case,
In re Adoption of 2003 Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified
Allocation Plan.120  Four public interest organizations sought re-
view of a New Jersey QAP that they argued encouraged racial seg-
regation in violation of the federal Fair Housing Act121 by funding
affordable housing in areas with high minority populations.122  The
organizations also contended that the QAP violated the section of
the New Jersey Constitution which prohibited segregation in public
schools.123  They further alleged that the Housing Mortgage Fi-
nance Agency’s (“HMFA”) allocation of tax credits would result in
nearly seventy-five percent of the projects being built in segregated
neighborhoods.124
115. KHADDURI ET AL., supra note 11, at 22. R
116. Id. at 10.
117. Id. at 22.
118. Id. at 2, 22.
119. Id. at 23.
120. 848 A.2d 1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), cert. denied, 861 A.2d 846 (N.J.
2004).
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-09.
122. In re Adoption, 848 A.2d at 5.  The organizations also contended that the QAP
violated the state’s Mount Laurel doctrine. Id. at 5-6.
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 9.
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The HMFA, the state agency responsible for implementing the
LIHTC program in New Jersey, countered that the QAP gave in-
centives to de-concentrate poverty, including adding preferences
for mixed-income housing developments.125  By contrast, in prior
years, credit preferences were given to projects that were afforda-
ble to one hundred percent of its tenants.126  The HMFA also re-
sponded that contrary to allegations that the 2003 QAP
encouraged racial segregation, it instead encouraged community
revitalization in urban neighborhoods by rewarding projects that
demonstrated a comprehensive strategy for such revitalization.127
The court first held that the HMFA was subject to the “affirma-
tively to further” requirement under the Fair Housing Act.128  The
requirement ensures that housing programs are administered in a
manner affirmatively to further the goal of fair housing.  That duty,
however, must be defined “congruent” with the statutory powers
of the HMFA.129
The organizations opposing the QAP argued that the affirmative
duty should be fulfilled by incorporating HUD regulations on site-
selection procedures into the QAP.130  These regulations required
that proposed sites for public-housing projects could not be located
in an area of minority concentration unless the project was neces-
sary to meet overriding housing needs which could not otherwise
feasibly be met in the area’s housing market.131  The court dis-
agreed, noting that neither HUD nor the IRS had expressly man-
dated that the state finance agencies adopt the regulations for
LIHTC projects.132  The HMFA was first and foremost a financing
entity, not a siting agency charged with selecting the locations of
the LIHTC projects.
The court found that the “overriding mission” of the HMFA was
to encourage the construction of affordable housing.133  Its duty to
“affirmatively further” fair housing had to be read within the con-
text of its housing agenda: “to end homelessness by addressing the
needs of low- and moderate-income families through the fostering
125. Id. at 8.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 9.
128. Id. at 13.
129. Id. at 14.
130. The four public interest organizations challenging the validity of the QAP
were the Fair Share Housing Center, the Camden County N.A.A.C.P., the Burlington
County N.A.A.C.P, and the Camden County Taxpayers Association. Id. at 6.
131. Id. at 13-14 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 941.202 (2005)).
132. Id. at 14.
133. Id. at 15.
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of new construction and rehabilitation of affordable-housing
units.”134  The fundamental mission of the HMFA could be com-
promised by focusing primarily on the racial composition of the
project’s locale.  The promotion of racial integration may be a “de-
sirable by-product” of the HMFA’s duties, but is not its central
mission.135
The case highlights the tensions between federal housing policies
that encourage the development of affordable housing and those
that promote residential desegregation.  It also highlights the ten-
sions between various organizations advocating for federally subsi-
dized housing programs.  On one hand, fair housing advocates
argue that the credits concentrate poverty and aid in re-segregation
of communities, causing these communities to decline.  Job and ed-
ucational opportunities become rare, and living conditions are
worsened.  On the other hand, local leaders and community devel-
opment organizations argue that the credits not only build housing
for those who can least afford it, but they also revitalize neighbor-
hoods which are in sore need of investment.136  The LIHTC is “vir-
tually the only capital available to neighborhoods that have been
effectively redlined by the private market.”137
3. The “GO Zone” QAP
The transformative nature of LIHTC projects has been incorpo-
rated into the priorities set for the QAP, which will regulate the
allocation of credits in the areas impacted by Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita.  In response to those two natural disasters, the U.S. Con-
gress authorized an increase in LIHTC credits allocated to Louisi-
ana as part of the Gulf Opportunity Zone Act of 2005 (“GO Zone
Act”).138  The GO Zone QAP targets resources to developments
that will achieve the State’s goals of providing workforce housing
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Orfield describes the spectrum of positions: 1) the regionalists who claim that
the LIHTC allocations concentrate poverty and segregate racial minorities; 2) the lo-
calist community development entities that support the tax credits as part of urban
revitalization efforts; and 3) a middle ground position taken by entities that advocate
civil rights, but “depend upon status quo programs.”  Orfield, supra note 3, at 1784-89. R
137. Id. at 1752-53.
138. Pub. L. No. 109-135, 119 Stat. 2577 (2005).  An extra eighteen dollars in tax
credits are allocated for each pre-hurricane resident in the Katrina disaster area for
the funding of an estimated 28,000 housing units in Louisiana. WILL FISCHER & BAR-
BARA SAND, HOUSING NEEDS OF MANY LOW-INCOME HURRICANE EVACUEES ARE
NOT BEING ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED 12 n.13 (Center on Budget and Policy Priori-
ties 2006), available at http://www.cbpp.org/2-23-06hous.pdf.
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and providing replacement housing for extremely-low-income
evacuees “without replicating the excessive concentration of pov-
erty that was prevalent prior to Hurricane Katrina.”139
The State’s policy objective for “workforce housing” was out-
lined in its “The Road Home Housing Programs Action Plan
Amendment for Disaster Recovery Funds.”140  The State defines
workforce housing as housing “affordable to important workforce
populations such as teachers, police, nurses, and firefighters.”141
To achieve the goal of de-concentrating poverty, mixed-income de-
velopments received preference in the QAP.142  Sponsors of such
developments must demonstrate how the project will lead to neigh-
borhood revitalization, de-concentration of poverty, and smart
growth.143  Factors that will be considered when considering pro-
grams include:
1) Affordability: Because it wishes to produce workforce hous-
ing, the state will look at the level of market rents relative to the
area’s median income and whether the developer “proposes to
accept a restriction on the rents charged for the units;”144
2) Mixed-Income Plan: The state will review “the likelihood that
[the developer] will successfully create a viable mixed-income
community;”145
3) Quality: The state will review the quality of the design, in-
cluding the proposed unit sizes, and the features and amenities
of the project;146 and
4) Other Public Purpose: The state will consider “the extent of
support for the project from the neighborhood and the local
139. LOUISIANA HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY, LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT
PROGRAM RESERVATIONS OF GULF OPPORTUNITY AMOUNT CREDITS CALENDAR
YEAR 2007 & 2008, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.lhfa.state.la.us/downloads/
lihtc/2007-QAP9-FinalDraft-15sept06.pdf [hereinafter GO Zone QAP].  Extremely
low income households are those in which the household income at initial occupancy
is thirty percent or less of the area median income. Id. at 39.
140. See sources cited supra note 15. R
141. GO Zone QAP, supra note 139, at 3. R
142. Id.
143. Id.  Smart growth includes considerations such as the proximity of the site to
public transit and basic community resources. Id. at 41.
144. Id. at 3.
145. Id.  To deconcentrate projects, the QAP awards more points to projects that
have a lower percentage of low-income units in the project (e.g., twenty percent) than
projects with a higher percentage (e.g., sixty percent). See id. at 63.  It also awards
points to projects located in census tracts in which the median income of the census
tract exceeds the area median income. See id.
146. Id. at 4.
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government” and “how the proposed project will facilitate the
economic and social improvement of the neighborhood.”147
Threshold requirements for processing a reservation of tax cred-
its include evidence of essential infrastructure and proximity to
other services.148  The project sponsor must show evidence that
reasonable transportation services are currently proximate to the
site or, if not, how tenants will be able to access commercial, educa-
tional, recreational, and other services upon completion of the pro-
ject.149 Amenities are also considered.  Washers and dryers in every
unit will receive twenty-five points, while providing a dedicated
room equipped with computers and high-speed internet access will
reward a sponsor with fifteen points.150
C. Priorities for LIHTC Projects
The success of the LIHTC program in building housing units
contrasts sharply with the failure of the credits to desegregate com-
munities and to de-concentrate poverty.  This failure may be the
result of a narrow view of the LIHTC program as simply one to
fund housing structures.151  Through their QAPs, states should in-
stead allocate LIHTC credits in a manner more sensitive to siting
decisions and more responsive to the housing, land use, and eco-
nomic needs of the region.  A flexible approach would consider the
credits part of a comprehensive plan to build housing units, to revi-
talize communities, and to provide services, such as emergency
housing, to a diverse population.
1. Mixed-Income Neighborhoods and Projects
Tavis Smiley, an African-American social commentator, declares
in his book The Covenant with Black America that “[f]ederal and
state policy-makers can set criteria that require LIHTC develop-
ments be located in opportunity-rich, mixed-income neighbor-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 59.
149. For example, points are awarded for certain services located within a specified
distance of the site: four points if a grocery store is located within one mile of the
project, three points if a public library is within two miles of the project.  Points can be
deducted for negative neighborhood services: five points are deducted if the project is
adjacent to, among other things, a junk yard, a wastewater treatment facility, a liquor
store, or an adult entertainment theater. Id.
150. Id. at 60.
151. The New Jersey HMFA in In re Adoption of 2003 Low Income Housing Tax
Credit Qualified Allocation Plan argued that it was a funding agency, rather than a
siting agency.  848 A.2d 1, 13-14 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 2004), cert. denied, 861 A.2d
846 (N.J. 2004).
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hoods.  Giving priority to tax credit housing in job-growth areas,
near public transit and near high-achieving schools, would
strengthen African-American residents’ access to other opportuni-
ties.”152  He is not alone in advocating for an approach to LIHTC
allocations as part of a regional housing strategy that extends be-
yond the provision of affordable shelter for low-income families.153
Officials responsible for the selection of LIHTC projects can con-
sider the transformative nature of such projects to a community
and its residents, targeting them to areas where market-rate hous-
ing is being constructed and where jobs, public transportation, and
educational opportunities exist.
One such targeted area would include neighborhoods that are
becoming “gentrified,” i.e., those in which housing prices are in-
creasing rapidly.154  Providing developers an incentive to locate af-
fordable housing in these communities will give lower-income
families a chance to live in mixed-income neighborhoods close to
transportation centers, to revitalized central business districts, and
to better public services such as parks and schools, all which make
the gentrified area desirable to higher-income residents.  Even
more so, the requirement that LIHTC units remain affordable for a
certain period of time will ensure that the units will not become
market-rate units, eventually pricing out of the neighborhood the
very residents for whom the project was intended to benefit.
Enhanced tax credits are given for placing LIHTC developments
in Qualified Census Tracts, that is, any census tract in which fifty
152. TAVIS SMILEY,  THE COVENANT WITH BLACK AMERICA 112 (2006).  The book
sets out ten covenants for Black America, and then outlines what individuals and
elected officials can do to accomplish each.  The LIHTC is discussed in Covenant V,
“Ensuring Broad Access to Affordable Neighborhoods.” Id.
153. See, e.g., KHADDURI & RODDA, supra note 94.  The authors state, “The availa- R
bility of affordable housing near jobs and around transportation nodes is important
for helping individual low-income families enter the economic mainstream.” Id. at 17
(citing BRUCE KATZ & MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER, RETHINKING AFFORDABLE
HOUSING STRATEGIES: AN ACTION AGENDA FOR LOCAL AND REGIONAL LEADERS
(The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy & The Urban
Institute, Dec. 2003)).
154. Id. at 18.  For opposing views on gentrification, compare J. Peter Byrne, Two
Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOW. L.J. 405 (2003), with John Powell & Marguerite
Spencer, Giving Them the Old “One-Two:” Gentrification and the K.O. of Impover-
ished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOW. L.J. 433 (2003).  Byrne views gentrification
as a process “by which people of higher income move into lower income urban areas
and seek to change its physical and social fabric to better meet their needs and prefer-
ences.”  Byrne, supra, at 406.  Powell and Spencer identify negative consequences of
gentrification: displacement; changes in power structures, institutions, and voting
power; and loss of local businesses and social services.  Powell & Spencer, supra, at
435.
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percent or more of the households have an income which is less
than sixty percent of the area median gross income or which has a
poverty rate of at least twenty-five percent.155  Incentives are also
given to place LIHTC developments in Difficult Development Ar-
eas, which are those  with high construction, land, and utility costs
relative to the area’s median gross income.156  While intended to
encourage developers to build in more distressed and disadvan-
taged areas, a consequence of this preference has been to promote
the building of many LIHTC developments in areas with above-
average concentrations of poverty.157  To counter this concentra-
tion of poverty when rebuilding New Orleans and in its vicinity, the
QAP must give priority to developments that will be located in
mixed-income neighborhoods located throughout the region.158
Creation of  mixed-income neighborhoods may require that the
QAPs give priority to mixed-income projects in which LIHTC units
and market rate rental units are included within the same develop-
ment.  The Louisiana Recovery Authority initially agreed to use
the LIHTC and CDBG funding to give developers an incentive to
build such projects.159  Unfortunately, few developers were inter-
ested in those projects, thus no mixed-income projects were
awarded when the first round of credits were allocated.160  As a
result, the LRA proposed to increase the tax credits available for
one hundred percent LIHTC developments.161  Critics of this ap-
proach argue that such developments would continue to concen-
trate poverty and the social problems that accompany it in New
Orleans.162
2. Using LIHTC Units to Provide  Emergency Shelter
A natural disaster on the scale of Hurricane Katrina results in
thousands of displaced residents in immediate need of some type
155. 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(ii) (2004).
156. Id.  The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development designates both the
Qualified Census Tract and the Difficult Development Areas. Id.
157. See Freeman, supra note 109, at 9. R
158. See Corkery, supra note 86 (discussing the risk that the LIHTC may be used to R
produce neighborhoods with concentrations of poverty).  In the article, Bruce Katz,
director of the Metropolitan Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, states that
the housing credits should be used to build housing for a mix of income levels and in
mixed-income neighborhoods to break the “enclaves of poverty.” Id. (quoting Bruce
Katz).
159. CONSEQUENCES FOR NEW ORLEANS, supra note 15, at 1. R
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 3.
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of shelter.  Residents without access to resources, whether due to
low income before the storm or to job loss after, are in dire need of
affordable housing to use as a base from which to rebuild their
lives.  Although not intended as a program for disaster relief, va-
cant LIHTC units outside of the disaster area can be used to pro-
vide temporary emergency shelter for displaced residents.
Housing developments funded by the project were used to pro-
vide temporary housing for Katrina victims.  Effective August 29,
2005, the date that President Bush declared Louisiana, Alabama,
and Mississippi disaster areas eligible for relief, the IRS tempora-
rily suspended certain income limitation requirements for qualified
projects in which vacant units were rented to displaced families.163
During the temporary housing period established by the state
housing credit agency,164 a displaced person qualified for purposes
of meeting the project’s 20-50 or 40-60 test.165  Furthermore, the
project owner was not required during the temporary housing pe-
riod to make attempts to rent to low-income persons any unit hous-
ing a displaced person.166  The non-transient use requirement did
not apply to any unit providing temporary housing to a displaced
individual during the temporary housing period.167  Rental restric-
tions were placed on the amount of rent that the displaced individ-
ual could be charged and existing tenants could not be evicted or
have their tenancy terminated as a result of efforts to provide tem-
porary housing for displaced individuals.168
D. Eminent Domain and Tax Credits
The exercise of eminent domain in New Orleans without a com-
prehensive program designed to ensure the development of afford-
able rental housing within the City and throughout the region
could lead to the creation of affluent segregated neighborhoods.
The City would then lack a workforce made up of residents with a
voice and vote in the City’s future and would lack the cultural com-
plexity that has been unique to New Orleans.  Property would be
transferred from the poor and working-class homeowners to pri-
vate developers who would construct market-rate housing meant
163. I.R.S. Notice 2005-69, 2005-40 I.R.B. 622.  Under the notice, a displaced indi-
vidual was one who resided in an Alabama, Louisiana, or Mississippi jurisdiction des-
ignated for Individual Assistance by FEMA as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Id.
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to attract middle- and high-income residents.  Such an idea is of-
fensive and unfair to displaced residents who desire to return but
lack the resources needed to rebuild their homes.
Too many municipalities failed to construct affordable housing in
“urban renewal” projects of the past in which eminent domain was
used to create vast parcels of land for redevelopment of so-called
“blighted” areas.  One of the best known examples of this failure is
the Southwest Waterfront neighborhood in Washington, D.C., the
site of the eminent domain controversy in Berman v. Parker.169
The original plan for the redevelopment of the “blighted” area in-
cluded housing for low-income residents, but “the planned provi-
sion for moderate or lower-income housing was never fully
implemented . . . .  Instead the project took on the most lucrative
forms of development (middle and upper class housing) and ne-
glected or abandoned schemes for economic integration.”170  The
equitable redevelopment of New Orleans demands that eminent
domain and the LIHTC credits be used strategically and congru-
ently to avoid neglecting the housing needs of residents who desire
to return, but may lack the resources to do so.
V. CONCLUSION
Private entities can play an important role in closing the chasm
between citizens’ demands and government’s abilities to meet
them.  LIHTC projects must be part of a comprehensive plan to
rebuild neighborhoods in New Orleans.  The inclusion of one or
two LIHTC projects in a neighborhood that itself is not being re-
built and strengthened will aid in rebuilding the City.  While a com-
prehensive plan involves land use planning, including friendly and
forced eminent domain (when necessary) to acquire needed
properties, a plan for New Orleans should be even broader.  It
should include considerations such as: (1) community engagement
in the process of selecting areas for eminent domain and for priori-
tizing certain areas for LIHTC projects; (2) regional approaches to
problems, including reducing regulatory barriers such as exclusion-
169. 348 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1954).  The area is once again under redevelopment. See
generally Dana Hedgpeth, Southwest Waterfront Will Finally Get Over the ‘60s, WASH.
POST, Oct. 9, 2006, at D1 (detailing current plans to rebuild southwest Washington
D.C.).
170. Audrey McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 51 (2006).
Professor McFarlane discussed whether local governments are limited in their ability
to use eminent domain to reconfigure urban areas to attract affluent residents. Id. at
40-60.
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ary zoning ordinances and practices to promote affordable hous-
ing;171 (3) workforce development;172 (4) improved schools;173 and
(5) improved transportation.174
The paradigms of “bulldoze and redevelop” versus empowering
property owners one at a time are not mutually exclusive.  Success-
ful recovery programs always combine both strategies, while pay-
ing particular attention to low-income people and communities.
For recovery programs to serve families and individual household-
ers with low incomes, special efforts must be made to include low-
income people in the process, treat them equitably, and provide
sufficient technical and financial assistance so that everyone who
wants to can go home again, if not to their own home, then some-
where nearby.175
The goal of an inclusive community is not attainable without sac-
rifices.  Local governments must be called upon to prudently exer-
cise their rather expansive land use planning and regulatory powers
along with their economic wherewithal to give New Orleans yet
another chance.
171. KHADDURI & RODDA, supra note 94, at 8-9, 12-13. R
172. Id. at 20, 24.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 20.  These suggestions are part of a strategy to redevelop distressed
neighborhoods.  The same approach can apply to a strategy for rebuilding a destroyed
neighborhood.
175. Werwath, supra note 49. R
